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Lewis v. Casey: Tightening the Boundaries
of Prisoner Access to the Courts?
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court recently decided Lewis v. Casey,1 con-
cerning the right of prisoners' access to the courts. Lewis fol-
lows a long line of cases regarding state interference with
inmates' ability to file claims and grievances in the courts. 2
From the relatively innocuous foundation of requiring the
unhindered ability of inmates to file habeas corpus petitions,
the Court's access decisions have evolved roughly along two sep-
arate constitutional lines. 3 Under the first line, the Court has
used Equal Protection 4 analysis 5 to hold that although there is
no constitutional right to an appeal, if a State opts to afford its
convicted felons an appeal, the state must provide it on an equal
basis, so as not to deny indigent defendants that right.6 From
these Equal Protection cases a doctrine evolved requiring the
States to affirmatively aid indigent inmates in obtaining access
to the courts. 7 Such affirmative action has generally included
the provision of adequate legal libraries in prisons for inmate
use.8 By providing these facilities, indigent inmates who are in-
eligible to receive the aid of free counsel are given the means
with which to formulate their own legal arguments necessary
1. 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
2. See Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), infra note 81 and accompanying
text.
3. See infra Section II Part B(1)(a)-(b).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. See infra notes 122-144 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 122-144 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 122-144 and accompanying text.




for the vindication of their claim. In turn, the ability to form
these arguments allows inmates to meet any technical require-
ments of getting a claim heard in court.
The second line of access cases has its support in Due Pro-
cess 9 analysis. 10 Within this line of prisoner access jurispru-
dence, the right of access has often been referred to as a
fundamental right." In other words, this line of cases has de-
fined a free standing right of access to the courts.12
These two fairly disparate lines of prisoner access jurispru-
dence merged in the landmark case of Bounds v. Smith.13 In
Bounds, which has remained the benchmark case to date, the
Court held that states have the affirmative duty to provide legal
libraries, or their reasonable equivalent, to prisoners so as to
effectuate prisoners' ability to have meaningful access to the
courts. 14 Lewis v. Casey marks the first drastic attempt 5 to
limit the concededly constitutional right of inmates to meaning-
ful court access by restricting inmate filings to habeas corpus
petitions or civil rights actions. 16
While Lewis was an unnecessary attempt at limiting the
access precedents, the more disturbing aspect of the case was
how the Court constricted this well recognized constitutional
right. Specifically, the Court found that the prisoners had no
standing to bring the suit in the federal courts, having shown
insufficient actual injury resulting from the complained of
shortcomings of the Arizona Department of Corrections' prison
law libraries.' 7 In an unnecessarily twisted analysis, the Court,
while finding the prisoners had no standing, nonetheless pro-
ceeded to reach the merits. The finding that plaintiffs lacked
standing should have ended the Court's discussion of the case.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See infra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
13. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
14. See id. at 828. See also infra notes 145-168 and accompanying text.
15. It must only be considered an attempt, because any discussion by the
Court in Lewis of limiting the scope of Bounds was necessarily dicta.
16. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2181.




Instead the Court overreached its jurisdiction in the case when
it elaborated on the scope of access to the courts. 18
This case note will argue that the Supreme Court has mis-
read, misapplied, and somewhat twisted precedent in reaching
its conclusions. Section II describes the background of the
Court's standing jurisprudence as well as its access to the
courts jurisprudence. Section III will discuss Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court in Lewis v. Casey. Section IV argues that
the Court took a fairly common and improper course in deciding
the case upon the plaintiffs' lack of standing and improperly dis-
cussed the merits of the underlying claim. Section V concludes
that, although the Court launched a discussion of the proper
scope of prisoners' access to the courts, any such discussion was
necessarily dictum, given the Court's ultimate holding that the




The doctrine of standing is a truly confused area of the
law. 19 "We need not mince words when we say that the concept
of 'Article III standing' has not been defined with complete con-
sistency."20 Many commentators have suggested that this con-
18. Standing is a jurisdictional requirement of Article III of the Constitution.
Any finding that a plaintiff is without standing is necessarily a determination that
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. See generally
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1983).
19. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1 (2d ed. 1994),
where the author states:
Standing frequently has been identified by both justices and commentators
as one of the most confused areas of the law. Justice Douglas remarked at
one point that "[gleneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless
as such." Professor Vining wrote that it is impossible to read the standing
decisions "without coming away with a sense of intellectual crisis. Judicial
behavior is erratic, even bizarre. The opinions and justifications do not illu-
minate." Thus, it is hardly surprising that standing... has been identified
as one of the most criticized constitutional doctrines.
Id. at 54 (citations omitted).
20. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). Of this quotation, Professor Nichol
commented: "[wihen Justice Rehnquist penned this quotation, he employed no
false sense of modesty. To the contrary, describing the law of standing as less than
19981 379
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fusion has led to abuses of the standing doctrine. 21 Specifically,
these critics argue that the Court often invokes the standing
doctrine as a means of avoiding the merits of a particularly
unappealing case; the Court will use standing simply as a vehi-
cle for avoiding cases it does not wish to decide. 22
In an often quoted passage regarding the nature of stand-
ing, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court stated that:
The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution .... [Tihe judicial power of federal
courts is constitutionally restricted to 'cases' and 'controversies.'
As is so often the situation in constitutional adjudication, those
two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their sur-
face simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart
of our constitutional form of government.23
What can safely be said of the standing doctrine is that it
finds as its source both constitutional requirements and pru-
consistent reflects a talent for understatement not often associated with the con-
troversial Justice." Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68,
68 (1984). Justice Rehnquist's statement has been understood to be the Court's
own admission that it has not articulated a uniform, cohesive test for standing.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 54. Justice O'Connor, in Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984), wrote that "[all of the doctrines that cluster about Article III...
relate.., to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and
explicit theory, about constitutional and prudential limits to the power of an
unelected . . . judiciary." Id. at 750 (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)).
21. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985).
22. See id., where the author stated:
The Burger Court's treatment of standing requirement has been, at best,
erratic. Access has, on occasion, been liberally granted. More often, the doc-
trine has been employed without consistent rationale to fence out disfavored
federal claims. This vacillation has created a body of Article III decisions
that ranks among the most uniformly criticized of the entire Burger Court
legacy.
Id. at 635 (footnotes omitted).
23. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94(1968). In Flast, the Court remarked:
In part those words limit the business of the federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capa-
ble of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words de-
fine the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to
assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
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dential concerns, such as judicial self-restraint. 24 The pruden-
tial concerns, which are judicially imposed limitations based
upon "prudent judicial administration,"25 are generally consid-
ered to entail three factors.26 First, the plaintiff, and hence the
claim, must be within the "zone of interest" of the statute or
constitutional provision invoked as the source of the injury or of
the protection. 27 Second, there is a general bar to a party liti-
gating the interests of third persons. 28 Finally, the injury com-
plained of must be a limited one, rather than a generalized type
of injury shared by the public as a whole.29 Because these pru-
dential considerations are the offspring of the judiciary's
24. See WRIGHT, ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
§ 3531 (2d ed. 1984) (stating that standing requirements come from two sources,
constitutional and prudential); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Es-
sential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1983)
('"The Supreme Court has. .. split[ ] the doctrine into two separate parts. The first
part consists of the so-called 'prudential limitations of standing,' . . . [and] [tihe
second part is the constitutional 'core' of standing, that is, a minimum requirement
... "); Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) ("[I]t has not always
been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features of the 'stand-
ing' requirement have been required by Art III ex proprio vigore, or whether they
are requirements that the Court itself has elected and which were not compelled
by the language of the Constitution.").
25. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 57.
26. See WRIGHT, supra note 24.
27. WRIGHT, supra note 24; see also Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
28. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); WRIGHT, supra note 24;
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 2.3.4. There are, however, other exceptions. The
first exception entails the situation wherein a third party, for some reason is un-
able to assert and represent their own interests, and the party before the Court
can properly represent that third parties' interests. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953) (where the white plaintiff, who was a party to the contract in
question, was able to assert the rights of black citizens, who, not being party to the
contract, had no right to challenge a restrictive racial covenant therein). A second
exception to this prudential standing barrier exists where there is a close relation-
ship between the third party and the litigant. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (a vendor had standing to assert the rights of his customers). The final
exception to the prudential prohibition against litigating the interests of third par-
ties not before the court occurs primarily in the context of First Amendment chal-
lenges. In this situation, a litigant may challenge a statute, which though
constitutional as applied, is, nonetheless, alleged to be unconstitutional as applied
to others not before the Court. In other words, a party can challenge a statute as
being overbroad as applied to those other persons. See, e.g., Secretary of State of
Maryland v. J.H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 19, § 2.3.4.
29. See WRIGHT, supra note 24.
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"mind," with no real, concrete basis in the Constitution, they
are subject to congressional alteration or rejection.30
Prudential limitations can be considered of lesser impor-
tance31 when compared to the constitutional standing require-
ments, which are ultimately derived from Article III case or
controversy 32 limitations to the jurisdictional reach of the fed-
eral courts. 33 This constitutional basis of standing is said to cre-
ate the "core" demarcation of standing.34 As the core element of
standing, a party seeking redress in the federal courts has the
burden of establishing that there is in fact a case or controversy
for the judiciary to decide. 35
2. The Infusion of Notions of Separation of Powers into
Standing Doctrine
One of the earliest discussions of standing by the Supreme
Court came in Massachusetts v. Mellon.36 In Mellon, the plain-
tiff alleged that an appropriations act passed by Congress was
unconstitutional.37 The plaintiff based her ability to bring the
suit upon her status as a taxpayer.38 The Court did not reach
the merits of the case but found it had no jurisdiction because
the plaintiffs lacked standing.39 The plaintiffs lacked standing
for two reasons. First, there was a policy consideration. By al-
lowing anyone to bring a claim against the government solely
by their status as a taxpayer, 40 the litigation "flood-gates" into
30. See Scalia, supra note 24, at 885.
31. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982), the Court stated that "neither the
counsels of prudence nor the policies implicit in the 'case or controversy' require-
ment should be mistaken for the rigorous Art. III requirements themselves. Satis-
faction of the [ prudential requirements] cannot substitute for a demonstration"
that the Art. III requirements are satisfied. Id.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
33. See infra part II(A)(3).
34. See Scalia, supra note 24, at 885.
35. See WRIGHT, supra note 24.
36. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
37. See id. at 479-80.
38. See id. at 486.
39. See id. at 480. "We have reached the conclusion that the cases must be
disposed of for want of jurisdiction without considering the merits of the constitu-
tional question." Id.
40. See id. at 487.
382 [Vol. 18:377
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the federal courts would burst open.41 Second, the Court recog-
nized that affording the plaintiff standing based upon her sta-
tus as a taxpayer would be an affront to a coequal branch of
government in our tripartite federal system.42 In other words,
there is a separation of powers component to be considered
when determining standing.43 It was this division of authority
that the Court was trying to maintain by refusing to consider
what it thought to be a non-justiciable question.4
In discussing this division of governmental power, the Mel-
lon Court articulated for the first time the requirements for
41. If paying taxes were the only requirement necessary to challenge a gov-
ernmental action, anyone could have standing to so challenge a governmental ac-
tion. The Courts would in essence become soap-boxes from which citizens could
voice their opposition to any governmental actions, as well as "judicial versions of
college debating forums." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982). "If one taxpayer may
champion and litigate [a claim,] then every other taxpayer may" file suit to com-
plain of any "appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the out-
lay of public money." Mellon, 262 U.S. at 487.
42. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488-89; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
43. It has been argued that the injection of separation of powers concerns as a
major element of standing analysis is inappropriate. In discussing Allen, Professor
Nichol argued that "[w]ithout explanation, and unsupported by ... decisions and
commentary, the Allen Court has ruled that the requirements of standing are to be
interpreted with a substantial view towards 'separation of powers principles.'"
Nichol, supra note 21, at 636 (citation omitted). Nichol went on to state that "this
infusion of separation of powers analysis ... departs sharply from standing law as
we have come to know it." See id. at 642. In his discussion of how the Court
seemingly adds the notion of separation of powers as an important element of
standing, out of nowhere, there was a distinct absence of any discussion of Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon. See id. It seems rather untenable to argue that the Court, in
1984, added this component to the standing doctrine when the Court had explicitly
mentioned such separation of powers concern as being an important element of
standing in 1923. See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488.
44. In Mellon, the Court elaborated on the separation of powers element of
standing when it stated:
The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To the leg-
islative department has been committed the duty of making laws; to the
executive the duty of executing them, and to the judiciary the duty of inter-
preting and applying them in cases properly brought before the courts. The
general rule is that neither department may invade the province of the
other and neither may control, direct, or restrain the action of the other ....
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground
that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when
the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a
justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. Then the power exercised
is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy.
7
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standing. Specifically, the Court stated that any party seeking
to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must demon-
strate that the statute or law in question was invalid.45 Fur-
ther, he must also demonstrate "that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the
result of its enforcement."46 It is insufficient for a person to sim-
ply claim an injury in common with the general public.47
In 1968, the Court revisited the issue of taxpayer standing
in Flast v. Cohen.48 In Flast, the question again before the
Court was whether the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear a
suit when the plaintiffs' only basis for standing was their status
as taxpayers. 49 In discussing the "amorphous"50 concept of
standing, the Flast Court stated:
[tihe fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the
party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not
on the issue he wishes to have adjudicated. The "gist of the ques-
tion of standing" is whether the party seeking relief has "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to as-
sure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." In other words, when stand-
ing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person
whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adju-
dication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is
justiciable.51
However, the Flast Court departed from Mellon with re-
spect to the separation of powers issue. In Mellon, separation of
powers considerations were an essential element which led the
45. See id. at 488.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
49. See id. at 88-91. Flast thereby raised the issue of taxpayer standing es-
sentially to determine the scope of the limitation on such standing, based upon
Mellon, which held that status as a taxpayer did not alone give a person the right
to seek redress from the government in federal courts. See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 487.
50. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (citations omitted). See also Cass R. Sunstein,
What's Standing After Lujan? Citizen Suits, "Injury," and Article III., 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163, 186-88 (1992).





Court to hold the plaintiffs' complaint non-justiciable. 52 The
Flast court, by contrast, stated that:
[tihe question whether a particular person is a proper party to
maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of
powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas
committed to other branches of the Federal Government. Such
problems arise, if at all, only from the substantive issues the indi-
vidual seeks to have adjudicated. Thus, in terms of Article III
limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing
is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated
will be presented in an adversary context and in a form histori-
cally viewed as capable of judicial resolution.53
Thus, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate a "nexus" between
the "status asserted" as someone injured by the law or action in
question, and the substantive claim.54
In United States v. Richardson,55 a case similar to Mellon in
that the plaintiff based his standing on his status as a taxpayer,
the Court reiterated the two-prong standing test announced in
Flast.56 As part of this inquiry, the plaintiff must show "(a) a
'logical link' between the status as a taxpayer and the chal-
lenged legislative enactment. .. and (b) a 'nexus' between the
plaintiffs status and a specific constitutional limitation im-
posed on the taxing and spending power."57 The Court repeated
that while the substantive claim is not important in determin-
ing standing, it must nonetheless be looked at in the limited
context of the second prong of the Flast standing test.58
Read together, Mellon,59 Flast,60 and Richardson6' stand for
the proposition that an individual's taxpayer status alone is in-
sufficient to confer upon that individual standing to challenge
the constitutionality of congressional acts. Article III's case or
controversy requirement is rather pragmatic. There must sim-
52. See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488.
53. Flast, 392 U.S. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
54. See id. at 102.
55. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
56. See id. at 170.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 174.
59. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
60. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
61. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
19981 385
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ply be some type of dispute between the parties; there must be
"concrete adverseness."62
Another watershed decision on standing came in Allen v.
Wright.63 There the Court essentially reaffirmed Mellon's hold-
ing regarding the prominence of separation of powers analysis
in any standing determination. 64 In Allen, the parents of black
school children alleged that the Internal Revenue Service and
Treasury Department's failure to follow policy requiring the de-
nial of tax-exempt status to segregated schools caused them in-
jury. 65 The suit essentially claimed the government's policy was
illegal. 66 In discussing the petitioner's standing, Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, reiterated the statement that
standing is "derived directly from the Constitution."67 After dis-
cussing the need for a plaintiff to satisfy the three constitu-
tional standing elements,68 the Court went on to state that "the
law of Article III standing is built on a single basic idea - the
idea of separation of powers."69 The upshot of Allen v. Wright
has been the renewed ascension of separation of powers analy-
sis into standing analysis. Not only must a plaintiff establish
that there is an actual dispute with an adversary, but the plain-
tiff must also demonstrate that judicial interference in the mat-
ter will not insult a coequal branch of government.
62. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1961). See also Schlesinger v. Reservists
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1973), where the Court stated that:
[SItanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest... which is held
in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract
nature of the injury all citizens share. Concrete injury, whether actual or
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part
to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution . . . Only
concrete injury presents the factual context within which a court, aided by
parties who argue within the context, is capable of making decisions.
Id. at 220-21.
63. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
64. See id. at 750-52.
65. See id. at 739.
66. See id. at 743-46.
67. Id. at 751.
68. See infra Part II(A)(3).
69. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/4
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3. Constitutional Standing Requirements
The Court has articulated the "irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing"70 to sue in federal court as consisting of
three elements. First, the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate
that he or she has suffered, or will imminently suffer, an actual
injury resulting from the complained of activity. 71 The second
element requires the potential plaintiff to show that there is a
causal connection between the complained of activity or law and
the actual injury.72 The final element is that the court must be
able to redress the plaintiffs injury. The latter two standing
requirements were articulated as distinct elements in Allen.73
The injury component of the standing test requires that a
plaintiff must have suffered, or will imminently suffer, an injury
as the result of the complained of action. "[Tihe plaintiff must
•.. suffer[ ] an 'injury in fact' - an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 'actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" 74 Further, when
seeking to enjoin an activity, a plaintiff must prove that the in-
jury complained of is likely to occur again to that plaintiff.75
70. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
71. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). A potential plaintiff must "'show he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury."' Id. at 472 (quoting
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 444 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)). See also Lujan,
504 U.S. 555; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 19; WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 3530, et seq.
72. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472.
73. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 2.3.3.
The "fairly traceable" and redressability components of the constitutional
standing inquiry were initially articulated by this court as two facets of a
single causation requirement. To the extent there is a difference, it is that
the former examines the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful
conduct and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the causal con-
nection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested. Cases
such as this, in which the relief requested goes well beyond the violation of
law alleged, illustrate why it is important to keep the inquiries separate if
the "redressability" component is to focus on the requested relief.
Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19 (citations omitted).
74. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).
75. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). Thus in Lyons, the
plaintiff was found to lack standing to enjoin the Los Angeles Police Department
from using choke holds, because he could not predict that he would again be sub-
ject to a choke hold by the police. See id.
11
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The causation component of the standing test is "relevant
because if the defendant is the cause of the plaintiffs injury,
then it is likely that halting the defendant's behavior will stop
the injury."76 Causation has been held to exist where the al-
leged injury is "'fairly trace [able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court."' 77 The final constitu-
tional standing requirement is that "it must be 'likely,' as op-
posed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed
by a favorable decision."'78
B. Access to the courts
1. The Rise of Bounds v. Smith7 9
a. A Fundamental Right of Access to the Courts
Ex Parte Hull80 is the foundation of prisoners' right of ac-
cess to the courts.8' In Hull, the petitioner challenged the Mich-
igan prison system policy requiring inmate habeas corpus
petitions to be approved by prison officials.8 2 In an often quoted
76. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 2.3.3, at 72.
77. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19 § 2.3.3, at 72.
78. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). The surprisingly
broad construction of this element of the standing test can be seen in Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). Here, the plaintiff, an unwed mother, filed suit
against her child's father for child support, as required by Texas State policy; her
requested relief was to have the defendant prosecuted for his failure to pay child
support. See id. The Court reasoned that there was no basis for the plaintiffs
standing, as there was no assurance that if the plaintiff was successful in requiring
the prosecution of the child's father, the plaintiff would receive the desired child
support payments. See id. at 618. In other words, there was no assurance that the
potential plaintiffs injury would be redressed by the courts.
79. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
80. 312 U.S. 546 (1940).
81. See Josephine R. Potuto, The Right of Prisoner Access: Does Bounds Have
Bounds, 53 IND. L. J. 207, 207 (1977-78) ("Ex Parte Hull is generally singled out as
the first case in which the Supreme Court found a right of access by prisoners to
the federal courts." (footnotes omitted)); MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISON-
ERS, § 11.01 (2d ed. 1993) ("Fittingly, the first prisoner's rights issue addressed by
the Supreme Court involv[ing] the right of access to courts" was Ex Parte Hull.);
JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, § 7.1 (4th ed. 1991) ("The
right of an inmate to exercise this basic constitutional right [of access] was estab-
lished in the 1940 case of Ex Parte Hull.").
82. See Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. at 549. The Michigan prison warden had al-
legedly promulgated an unpublished regulation stating that:
388
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passage, the Hull court stated that a "state and its officers may
not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal
court for a writ of habeas corpus."8 3 That one phrase is the
foundation for all subsequent cases which considered the rights
of prisoners to access the courts. According to Professor Mil-
lemann,8 4 Ex Parte Hull marks the first of three distinct phases
in the evolution of prisoners' right to access the courts.85 In the
first phase, the Supreme Court "invalidated restrictions that lit-
erally denied prisoners the ability to lodge legal papers in a
court of law."8 6
The next major decision in the access to the courts arena
was Johnson v. Avery,8 7 wherein the Court held unconstitu-
tional a restriction on the use of "jailhouse lawyers," finding
that such restrictions tended to burden primarily illiterate and
indigent prisoners 8 In Johnson, the Court was asked to deter-
'[aill legal documents, briefs, petitions, motions, habeas corpus proceedings
and appeals will first have to be submitted to the institutional welfare office
and if favorably acted upon be then referred to [the] legal investigator of the
Parole Board .... Documents submitted to [the legal investigator], if in his
opinion are properly drawn, will be directed to the court designated or will
be referred back to the inmate.'
Id. at 548.
83. Id.
84. Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
85. See Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners' Right to
Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 MD.
L. REV. 455, 459-60 (1989).
86. Id. at 460. See also Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1941), decided in the
term following the Ex Parte Hull decision, where the Court reexamined a state
prison administration's interference with an inmate's ability to file a habeas peti-
tion. See id. at 255-56. The Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court's denial of
petitioner's habeas petition. See id. at 258. Cochran, the pro se petitioner, claimed,
inter alia, that the prison official enforcing "rules there in effect had suppressed
appeal documents he had prepared, thereby making it impossible for him to per-
fect an appeal" within the statute of limitations for such an appeal. Id. at 256. In
discussing this claim, "[t]he State properly concede[d] that if the alleged facts per-
taining to suppression of Cochran's appeal 'were disclosed as being true before the
Supreme Court of Kansas, there would be no question but that there was a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment.'" Id. at 257.
Because the State failed to properly dispel the claim that the state burdened his
ability to file his petition, the Court concluded that the action had to be remanded
to determine if petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated.
See id. at 258.
87. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
88. See id. at 487. 'There can be no doubt that Tennessee could not constitu-
tionally adopt and enforce a rule forbidding illiterate or poorly educated prisoners
13
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mine whether Tennessee prison authorities, pursuant to their
prison regulations, could constitutionally prevent jailhouse law-
yers from aiding fellow inmates in the preparation of their legal
paperwork.8 9 Specifically, Johnson dealt with the ability of in-
mates, acting as legal assistants, to help other inmates file peti-
tions for habeas corpus.90 In discussing the "Great Writ,"91 the
Court stated that "[since the basic purpose of the writ is to en-
able those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is
fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the pur-
pose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or
obstructed."92
Tennessee argued that prohibiting jailhouse lawyers was
necessary as part of its penalogical interest, and stated that
such a prohibition was "part of the State's disciplinary adminis-
tration of its prisons."93 The Court disagreed, finding that such
a penalogical interest was an insufficient interest to overcome
an inmate's constitutional rights.94 The Court did not go so far
as to require that Tennessee allow an unlimited legal practice
by jailhouse lawyers. 95 Tennessee could legitimately impose
some restrictions, such as the time and location when the jail-
house lawyers would be available. 96 Further, Tennessee could
altogether eliminate jailhouse lawyers so long as it provided a
reasonable equivalent.97
to file habeas corpus petitions. Here Tennessee has adopted a rule which, in the
absence of any other source of assistance for such prisoners, effectively does just
that." Id. Without the aid of the jailhouse lawyer, many indigent inmates would
be unable to effectively and meaningfully file habeas corpus petitions.
89. See id. at 484.
90. See id.
91. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485.
92. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 486.
94. See id. The Johnson Court stated that:
[t]here is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detention fa-
cilities are state functions. They are subject to federal authority only where
paramount federal constitutional ... rights supervene. It is clear, however,
that in instances where state regulations applicable to inmates of prison
facilities conflict with such rights, the regulations may be invalidated.
Id. In so stating, the Court seemed to implicitly recognize the existence of a funda-
mental, constitutional right of access to courts.
95. See Johnson, 393 U.S. at 490.





Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, stated that:
[t]he plight of a man in prison may [with regard to dealing with
the legal system] be even more acute than the plight of a person
on the outside. He may need collateral proceedings to test the
legality of his detention or relief against management of the pa-
role system or against defective detainers lodged against him
which create burdens in the nature of his incarcerated status. He
may have grievances of a civil nature against those outside the
prison. His imprisonment may give his wife grounds for divorce
and be a factor in determining the custody of his children; and he
may have pressing social security, workman's compensation, or
veteran's claims.98
Hence, the Court recognized the well established principle
that imprisonment does not dissolve all the rights that the in-
mate formerly enjoyed as a free citizen. 99 "While at least one
19th-century court characterized the prison inmate as a mere
'slave of the State,' in recent decades this Court has repeatedly
held that the convicted felon's loss of liberty is not total."100
Professor Millemann has stated that Johnson v. Avery
marks the beginning of the second "phase" of access cases,
wherein "the Court [has] held that the access right guarantees
more than the literal right to file documents in court."10 John-
98. Id. at 492-93 (Douglas, J., concurring).
99. See Alvin J. Bronstein, Prisoners' Rights: A History, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF
PRIsoNERs 20 (Geoffrey P. Alpert ed., 1980). "In the main, prisoners' rights issues
revolve around this question: Does the Constitution follow a person into prison?
The answer given by most cases today seems to be 'yes, to some extent.' This is in
marked and comforting contrast [to previous answers, wherein] ... prisoners were
left to the not-so-tender mercies of their keepers." Id. See also Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974), where the Court stated that:
[i]f the position implies that prisoners in state institutions are wholly with-
out the protections of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause, it is
plainly untenable. Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable
many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a 'retraction justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system.' But though his rights
might be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional envi-
ronment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections
when he is imprisoned for a crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between
the Constitution and the prisons of this country .... They retain right of
access to the courts.
Id. at 555-56 (citations omitted).
100. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2176, 2206 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. 790, 796 (1871)).




son thus established a rule that a state could not even indirectly
impede an indigent inmate's access to the courts. "Unless the
state or some other source provides legal help to indigent pris-
oners, the state may not indirectly obstruct access by prevent-
ing prisoner 'writ writers' from [aiding] 'other indigent
prisoners."102
The constitutional right of prisoner access to the courts by
filing habeas corpus petitions was expanded in Wolff v. McDon-
nell10 3 to include the filing of civil rights actions. 10 4 In Wolff, the
State argued, inter alia, that Johnson was limited solely to
"assistance in the preparation of habeas corpus petitions."10 5
The Court rejected that argument, finding that the State took
too narrow a view of the Johnson holding. 10 6 In so holding, the
Court noted that "the demarcation line between civil rights ac-
tions and habeas petitions is not always clear."10 7 The Court
stated that the primary difference between habeas petitions
and civil rights actions was that the habeas petitioner could po-
tentially win his freedom. 0 8 However, "it is more pertinent that
both actions serve to protect basic constitutional rights. The
rights of access to the courts, upon which [Johnson v.] Avery was
premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that
no person will be denied [access to the courts]."109 The Court
went on to declare that the constitutional rights which prison-
ers retain during their incarceration "would be diluted if in-
mates, often 'totally or functionally illiterate,' were unable to
articulate their complaints to the courts.""0
102. Id. at 460.
103. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
104. See id. at 542-43. Inmates here filed a civil rights action alleging the
unconstitutional conditions of their confinement. See id.
105. Id. at 579.
106. See id.
107. Wolf, 418 U.S. at 579.
108. See id. at 578-79.
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The third phase"' of the access to courts jurisprudence
came in a per curiam opinion, Younger v. Gilmore,"2 where the
Court explicitly upheld a prisoners' access case decided by the
Northern District of California." 3 In Gilmore v. Lynch, plain-
tiffs, who were inmates in California prisons, alleged that
prison regulations concerning their access to legal materials ef-
fectively denied them meaningful access to the courts. 1 4 The
State responded that prisoners' access to legal books "is a mat-
ter of governmental grace, i.e. a privilege to be withheld or con-
ditioned as the State chooses." 115 The Court noted that the
State's use of the term "privilege" rather than the use of "right"
would not alter the essential element of the case. 1 6 The Court
went on to state:
Reasonable access to the courts is a constitutional imperative
which has been held to prevail against a variety of state interests.
111. See Millemann, supra note 85, at 460, where Professor Millemann stated
that the Court's decision:
[in] Younger v. Gilmore marked the beginning of phase three. In Younger,
the Court cryptically indicated that the access right is not satisfied by state
inaction or alleged neutrality, i.e., when the state refrains from interfering -
either directly or indirectly - with prisoner access to the courts. Instead, the
access right requires, in some circumstances, that states provide affirmative
help to indigent prisoners.
Id.
112. 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
113. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
114. See id. at 108.
115. Id. The state answered with reference to dicta in Hatfield v. Bailleaux,
290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961), a decision by a three-judge court of this Circuit.
While affirming the right of the incarcerated not to be unreasonably hindered in
making use of the courts, Hatfield added that "'[s]tate authorities have no obliga-
tion . . . to provide library facilities and an opportunity for their use to enable an
inmate to search for legal loopholes in the judgment and sentence under which he
is held, or to perform services which only a lawyer is trained to perform.'" Id. at
640 (citations omitted).
116. See Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 108, where the court noted that:
The Courts have used various linguistic formulae to describe the limits to
prison rule-making authority, sometimes speaking of constitutional rights
which are so preeminent that they cannot be alienated no matter what the
need of penal administration might be, and at other times voiding regula-
tions which confer or withhold "privileges" so arbitrarily as to constitute un-
equal protection of the laws to certain classes of prisoners. In most cases,
however, the basic test remains the same: the asserted interests of the State
in enforcing its rule is balanced against the claimed right of the prisoner
and the degree to which it has been infringed by the challenged rule.
Id. at 108-09.
17
394 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:377
Similarly, the right under the equal protection clause of the indi-
gent and uneducated prisoner to the tools necessary to receive ad-
equate hearing in the courts has received special reenforcement
by the federal courts in recent decades. 117
Thus, Younger's affirmation of the lower court's decision
suggests that states may not interfere"" with a prisoner's ac-
cess to courts, and may even be required to shoulder affirmative
burdens in effectuating this right for prisoners. 1 9
There appear to be two distinct foundations upon which the
general "right of access" for prisoners is based. 120 The first basis
for the right is a fundamental right of access with its foundation
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
discussed above. 121 Commingled with this Due Process line of
cases is a separate line of prisoner access cases based on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 122
117. See id. at 109 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
118. See Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1940).
119. See Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 110, where the Court stated:
'Access to the courts' . . . encompasses all the means a defendant or peti-
tioner might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges
brought against him or grievances alleged by him. In some contexts this has
been interpreted to require court-appointed counsel for indigents. Gideon v.
Wainwright [372 U.S. 335 (1963)] and Douglas v. California [372 U.S. 353
(1963)]. In other situations, the State might be obligated to provide free
transcripts, process-serving facilities, and in forma pauperis filing
privileges.
Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 110 (citations omitted).
120. See Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 109. "Plaintiffs argue, then, that at stake
here are two principles of recognized importance, i.e. their rights to reasonable
access to the courts, and to equal protection of the laws." Id.
121. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro
Se Litigant's Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgement
Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115, 1116 (1987); Note, Constitutional Law: Prisoner
"No-Assistance" Regulations and the Jailhouse Lawyer, 1968 DUKE L. J. 343, 354
(1968) ("Vindication of the right to petition for the writ necessarily requires access
to the courts, a privilege secured against state intrusion by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.") (emphasis added); David Gerald Jay, The Rights of
Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFF. L. REv. 397, 414-15 (1965).
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Justice Clark disapprovingly described
this equal protection line of decisions, dealing with the equality of treatment for
indigents, as being a "new fetish for indigency" with which "the Court piles an
intolerable burden on the State's judicial machinery." Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 359 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/4
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b. The Requirement of Equal Access to the Courts
In Griffin v. Illinois,123 the petitioners challenged a state
policy wherein trial transcripts, which the State conceded were
necessary for a meaningful appellate review, 124 would not be
provided, free of charge, to indigent defendants. 25 Under the
State's policy, transcripts were only provided when there was a
constitutional issue; mere "trial errors such as admissibility
and sufficiency of evidence" were insufficient to warrant the
provision of a free trial transcript.126 Petitioners alleged this
policy denied them Due Process and Equal Protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 27 The Supreme Court agreed, holding
that where a state affords appellate review, it must do so
equally. 28 The Court noted that the State's refusal to afford
full appellate review solely because of poverty was a denial of
due process and equal protection. 129 To so hinder indigent pris-
oners "means that many of them may lose their life, liberty or
property because of unjust convictions which appellate courts
would set aside." 30 While the Court held that it was unconsti-
tutional for the State to deny transcripts to indigent defendants
solely because of their poverty, the Court did not require that a
state furnish such indigents a transcript, leaving the option
open for a state to devise an alternative "means of affording ad-
equate and effective appellate review."' 3' While the petitioners
couched their claim in both the Equal Protection and the Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
clearly based its decision upon the Equal Protection violation.
123. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
124. See id. at 16.
125. See id. at 22. "Illinois has decreed that only defendants who can afford to
pay for the stenographic minutes of a trial may have trial errors reviewed on ap-
peal by the Illinois Supreme Court." Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 15.
127. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13.
128. See id. at 18. There is no question that the States have no affirmative,
constitutional obligation to afford such appellate review. See id.; see also Long v.
District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
129. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
130. Id. at 19.
131. Id. at 20.
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The Court held that it was improper to make a classification in
this situation based solely upon an indigent's wealth. 132
In Douglas v. California,133 the petitioners challenged a
California rule of criminal procedure which did not provide an
indigent defendant a state appointed attorney free of charge for
that convicted defendant's first and only appeal of right. 34
Under this procedure, the California Court of Appeals would
make an ex parte review of the trial records to determine if an
appeal was warranted; if so, the court would provide the indi-
gent defendant with counsel. 35 Relying on the reasoning of
Griffin, 36 the Supreme Court held that such a policy violated
the Equal Protection Clause 37 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 138 "Here the issue is whether or not an indigent shall be
denied the assistance of counsel on appeal. In either the situa-
132. See id. at 18. See also Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 710 (1961) ("The
gist of [Griffin and Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)] is that because '[t]here is no
rational basis for assuming that indigents' motions for leave to appeal will be less
meritorious than those of other defendants ... '[t]here can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends upon the amount of money he has'...
and consequently that '[t]he imposition by the State of financial barriers restrict-
ing the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal defendants has no
place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law.'") (quoting Burns, 360 U.S. at
257-58; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19).
133. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
134. See id. at 355-56.
135. See id. at 354-55.
136. 351 U.S. 12.
137. Justice Harlan, dissenting, disapproved of the Courts use of Equal Pro-
tection analysis, stating that the appropriate analysis should have been under the
Due Process Clause. "The sole classification established by [the California] rule is
between those cases that are believed to have merit and those regarded as frivo-
lous." Douglas, 372 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather, the appropriate
inquiry is "the narrow one [ofl whether the State's rules with respect to the ap-
pointment of counsel are so arbitrary or unreasonable, in the context of the particu-
lar appellate procedure that it has established, as to require their invalidation." Id.
at 365.
138. The Court stated that under the California policy:
[tihere is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefits of counsel's
examination into the record, research of the law, and marshaling arguments
on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary deter-
mination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The
indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the





tion of this case or that addressed in Griffin, the evil is the
same: discrimination against the indigent."1 39
The holding of Douglas was restricted several years later in
Ross v. Moffitt, 40 where the Court refused to expand the Doug-
las requirement of free counsel for indigents in an initial appeal
of right, to provide free counsel for additional discretionary ap-
peals. The Court fully recognized the scope and applicability of
Douglas, yet chose not to expand that doctrine.' 4 ' While the
Court seemed to be uncertain as to the constitutional source of
the Griffin and Douglas holdings, the Court analyzed the case
under both equal protection and due process theories. 142 In its
bifurcated analysis, the Court first found that the State's failure
to provide counsel in discretionary appeals did not violate due
process. 43 The Court then rejected petitioners' claim under the
equal protection analysis by stating:
The Fourteenth Amendment 'does not require absolute equality
or precisely equal advantages' . . . [i]n this case we do not believe
that the Equal Protection Clause, when interpreted in the context
of these cases, requires North Carolina to provide free counsel for
indigent defendants seeking to take discretionary appeals to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, or to file petitions for certiorari in
this Court.'"
2. Bounds v. Smith 45
The due process and equal protection lines of cases were
incorporated in the seminal prisoners' access case of Bounds v.
Smith. At issue was "whether States must protect the right of
139. Id. at 355.
140. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
141. See id. The Moffitt Court stated that:
[tihe court in Douglas concluded that a State does not fulfill its responsibil-
ity towards indigent defendants merely by waiving its own requirements
that a convicted defendant procure a transcript or pay a fee on order to ap-
peal, and held that the State must go further and provide counsel for the
indigent on his first appeal as of right.
Id. at 607.
142. See id. at 608-09.
143. See id. at 611. "The fact that an appeal has been provided does not auto-
matically mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to
indigent defendants at every stage of the way." Ross, 417 U.S. at 611.
144. Id. at 612 (citations omitted).




prisoners' access to the courts by providing them with law li-
braries or alternative sources of legal knowledge." 146 The Court
stated quite clearly that such a requirement had in fact already
been required of the states by Younger v. Gilmore.147
The Court next discussed the line of cases dealing with
equal access to the courts. The Court noted that many of its
recent decisions in this field required that states provide "ade-
quate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts for in-
mates. 148 The Court then cited examples of decisions 149 where it
invalidated requirements that indigent inmates pay docket
fees, 50 that states provide free transcripts, 151 and that counsel
be appointed for appeals of right.152 Finally, the Court dis-
cussed the other line of cases, which declared the right of access
as a free standing right under the Due Process Clause. 53
Petitioners claimed, however, that the Johnson54 line of
cases held that "as long as inmate communications on legal
problems are not restricted, there is no further obligation to ex-
pend state funds to implement affirmatively the right of ac-
cess." 55 The Court found that petitioners misinterpreted the
cases. 56 The Court referred to cases like Gideon v. Wain-
wright157 and Douglas v. California 58 as examples of the re-
quirement that states take affirmative steps toward ensuring
indigent inmates' access to the courts. 59
146. Id.
147. 404 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-22 ("It is now estab-
lished beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the
courts... [tihis Court recognized that right more than 35 years ago [in Ex Parte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1940)].").
148. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822-23.
149. See id.
150. See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959).
151. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
152. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
154. See supra Part II(B)(1)(a). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969); Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1940).
155. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823.
156. See id. at 823-25.
157. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
158. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).




The Court reasoned that a legal library is critical to an indi-
gent prisoner's ability to file meaningful court papers, stating
that the prisoner "must know what the law is in order to deter-
mine whether a colorable claim exists, and if so, what facts are
necessary to state a cause of action."160 Further, without access
to legal materials, it is quite unlikely that a pro se prisoner will
be able to adequately respond to the prison authorities' respon-
sive pleadings. 161
Finally, the Court rejected petitioner's claim that under
Ross v. Moffitt, 62 legal "libraries or other forms of legal assist-
ance are unnecessary to assure meaningful access" to the
courts. 63 The Bounds Court distinguished Ross by noting that
there, the question before the Court concerned an indigent pris-
oner's rights pertaining to discretionary appellate review.' 64
The Bounds Court, however, was "concerned in large part with
original actions seeking new trials, release from confinement, or
vindication of fundamental rights. Rather than presenting
claims that have been passed on by two courts, they frequently
raise heretofore unlitigated issues." 65 Further, in these cases,
"the prisoners' petitions [] are the first line of defense against
constitutional violations."1 66 In a discretionary post conviction
appeal, there is often less need for rigorous legal research, since
the legal issues are likely sifted out in the initial post-conviction
appeal of right. However, in litigating new claims, the prisoner
has no such benefit. Without access to legal materials, the in-
mate may stand virtually no chance of successfully raising the
claim.
160. Id. at 825. The Bounds Court further stated that:
[ilf a lawyer must perform such preliminary research, it is no less vital for a
pro se prisoner. Indeed, despite the "less stringent standards" by which a
pro se pleading is judged, it is often more important that a prisoner compli-
ant set forth a nonfrivolous claim meeting all procedural prerequisites, since
the court may pass on the complaint's sufficiency before allowing filing of in
forma pauperis and may dismiss the case if it is deemed frivolous.
Id. at 825-26 (citations omitted).
161. See id. at 826.
162. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
163. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827.
164. See id.
165. Id. (emphasis added).




The Court, however, did repeat a common current in access
to courts jurisprudence when it held that legal libraries are not
the only means of vindicating the constitutionally protected ac-
cess to the courts, and that the states are free to create alterna-
tives to legal libraries. 167 The one caveat is that a state's
alternative must, like legal libraries, be reasonably likely to re-
sult in inmates' ability to exercise their right to access the
courts. 168
There were three noteworthy dissents in Bounds.169 Chief
Justice Burger stated that "[t]he Court leaves us unenlightened
as to the source of the 'right of access to the courts' which it
perceives or of the requirement that States 'foot the bill' for as-
suring such access for prisoners who want to act as legal re-
searchers and brief writers."170 Justice Rehnquist added
"Itihere is nothing in the United States Constitution which re-
quires that a convict serving a term of imprisonment... ha[s] a
'right of access"' to the courts. 17' Justice Stewart questioned
the Court's reliance on Younger v. Gilmore, noting that "[firom
th[e] basic principle [of Johnson v. Avery,] the Court over five
years ago made the quantum jump to the conclusion that a
State has a constitutional obligation to provide law libraries for
prisoners in custody."'172
III. Lewis v. Casey 73
A. Facts and Procedural History
In January 1990, twenty-two inmates of the Arizona De-
partment of Corrections ("ADOC") filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 claiming, in part, that they were denied their constitu-
tional right of access to the courts as a result of ADOC poli-
cies. 74 After a three month trial, the United States District
167. See id. at 830-32. "Nevertheless, a legal access program need not include
any particular element . . .and we encourage local experimentation. Any plan,
however, must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with constitu-
tional standards." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832.
168. See id. at 830-32.
169. See id. at 837.
170. Id. at 833-34.
171. Id. at 838.
172. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 836.
173. 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).




Court for the District of Arizona ruled in favor of the plaintiff
class, finding, inter alia, that the condition of the ADOC's legal
libraries, in effect, denied inmates access to the courts. 175
After finding a constitutional violation of the inmates' ac-
cess to the courts, the district court appointed a special master
to fashion an appropriate injunctive remedy. 176 On October 13,
1993, the district court accepted the special master's recommen-
dation and granted the permanent injunction. 77
Petitioners, officials of the ADOC, appealed the district
court's issuance of the injunction to the Ninth Circuit. 178 The
Ninth Circuit refused to stay the district court's injunction. 179
The Supreme Court stayed the injunction and remanded the
case to the Ninth Circuit to hear petitioners' appeal. 80 After
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision,' 8 ' cer-
tiorari was granted. 8 2
B. Majority Opinion
While petitioners raised many issues on appeal,8 3 "their
most fundamental contention [was] that the District Court's
findings of injury were inadequate to justify the finding of sys-
tem-wide injury and hence the granting of system-wide re-
lief."18 4 There were two facets to petitioners' argument. 8 5
First, petitioners argued that a prisoner, in order to establish a
Bounds violation, must demonstrate that he was actually in-
175. See id. The District Court found the following aspects of the ADOC's
facilities to result in constitutional violations; "the contents of the library; the ac-
cess to the library; the legal assistance for prisoners who are illiterate or who do
not speak English; library staffing; the indigency standards for receiving legal sup-
plies .... " Id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Casey v. Lewis, 43 F.3d at 1265.
179. See id.
180. See Lewis v. Casey, 115 S. Ct. 1997 (1995).
181. See Casey v. Lewis, 43 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1994).
182. See Lewis v. Casey, 115 S. Ct. 1997.
183. See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (1996). These challenges "in-
cluded renewed attacks on the [district] court's findings of the Bounds violations
with respect to illiterate, non-English-speaking and lockdown prisoners, and on
the breadth of the injunction." Id.
184. Id. See also Brief for Petitioners, Lewis v. Casey, 1995 WL 490050 (No.
94-1511).




jured by the alleged inadequacies at the prison facility: "- that
is, 'actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing liti-
gation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to pres-
ent a claim." ' 18 6 While respondents claimed that petitioners
did not raise this argument before the lower courts, and hence
had waived their ability to assert this argument, 8 7 the Court
noted that respondent's claim, even if true, was irrelevant. 88
Because standing is jurisdictional in nature, it cannot be
waived by a party, and may be raised at any time, sua sponte,
by the Court. 8 9 The second element of petitioner's argument
was that there was insufficient actual injury to warrant the dis-
trict court's granting of system-wide relief.190
The Court, in addressing these issues, held that respon-
dents were in fact required to demonstrate system-wide actual
injury in order to receive system-wide relief.191 The Court
stated that the lower court's inability "to identify anything more
than isolated instances" of injury precluded the courts from is-
suing the system-wide relief it did in the injunction. 92 In other
words, plaintiffs were without standing to raise a claim of sys-
tem-wide injury resulting from inadequate libraries. 93
The Court reasoned that its refusal to find the respondents
had the requisite standing was required because of separation
of powers considerations. 94 "It is the role of courts to provide
relief to claimants . . . who have suffered, or will imminently
suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of the courts, but that of the
political branches, to shape the institutions of government in
such fashion as to comply with the laws and the 'Constitution. "195
The federal courts are not the regulators of state prisons. Com-
pliance with applicable standards for ensuring adequate pris-
oner access to the courts is more properly the provence of the
186. Id.
187. See Brief for Respondent at 25-26, Lewis v. Casey, 1995 WL 577632 (No.
94-1511).
188. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2179 n.1 (citations omitted).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 2179.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2179 n.1.
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political branches of government. 196 Thus, unless a prisoner
could show "actual injury,"1 97 the alleged constitutional viola-
tion is not for the courts to decide. 19
The Court, in framing the question, asked what actual in-
jury a plaintiff must establish in order to demonstrate a Bounds
violation. 99 Bounds "did not create an abstract, free-standing
right to a law library or legal assistance .... ",200 Rather, it sim-
ply reaffirmed the right of prisoners to access the courts.20'
Thus, regarding alleged Bounds violations, 20 2 "'meaningful ac-
cess to the courts is a touchstone,'. . . [yet] the inmate ... must
go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcom-
ings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his ef-
forts to pursue a legal claim."203 The Court stated that such a
burden is satisfied if a prisoner can demonstrate, for example,
that his complaint was dismissed, with prejudice, because of his
failure to comply with any technical requirements, of which he
was unaware due to the inadequate legal research facilities at
his prison.20 4 Likewise, such injury would also be established
when a prisoner could demonstrate that he had "suffered [an]
arguabl[y] actionable harm[,]" yet in pursuing the claim "was so
196. See id.
197. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
199. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2180-81. "Although Bounds itself made no men-
tion of an actual-injury requirement," it could not have eliminated this constitu-
tionally required element necessary to invoke federal court jurisdiction. Id. at
2180.
Moreover, the assumption of an actual-injury requirement seems to us im-
plicit in the [Bounds] opinion's statement that 'we encourage local experi-
mentation' in various methods of assuring access to the courts... [for] [we
hardly think that what we meant by 'experimenting' with such an alterna-
tive was simply announcing it, whereupon suit would immediately lie to de-
clare it theoretically inadequate and bring the experiment to a close.
Id. at 2180-81. Only after an inmate can show injury resulting from the alterna-
tive practice can that inmate demonstrate the requisite standing.
200. Id. at 2180.
201. See id. at 2179 (citations omitted).
202. See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. at 2180.
203. Id. at 2180 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 823 (1977)) (quotations
omitted).
204. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2180.
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stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable
to even file a complaint."205
With an eye toward determining whether the plaintiffs
here had standing, the Court then discussed the rights reaf-
firmed in Bounds.2 6 The Court stated that prisoners have no
right to have legal libraries or legal assistance in order to dis-
cover potential claims.207 Therefore, when a prisoner fails as a
result of an inadequate library to discover a claim he might
have had, there can be no injury and hence no standing.208
In further discussing the requisite injury a prisoner must
demonstrate to prove standing to claim a Bounds violation, the
Court determined what types of claims are important enough to
require the availability of legal research resources. 20 9 There is a
limit to what prisoners may or may not do with respect to the
right of access to the courts. The Court stated that Bounds was
unfaithful to precedent, and hence wrong, in its elaboration of
the boundaries of access to the courts. 210 There is nothing in the
205. Id. One question of great moment to the Court was whether the loss of a
frivolous law suit could serve as the basis for establishing actual injury resulting
from a Bounds violation. The Court answered this question in the negative, stat-
ing that the loss of frivolous suits will not establish standing. See id. at 2180 n.2.
Justice Scalia, for the majority, rebutted Justice Souter's assertion to the con-
trary. Justice Souter claimed that there is standing to bring a frivolous suit, be-
cause the disputed claim "'will be presented in an adversary context, and in a form
historically viewed as capable ofjudicial resolution."' Id. at 2181 n.3 (quoting Flast
v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 83, 101 (1968)). Justice Scalia responded to the effect that cases
subsequent to Flast pointed out the Flast Court's error in not "recogniz[ing] that
[the standing] doctrine has a separation-of-powers component, which keeps the
courts within certain traditional bounds vis-a-vis the other branches, concrete ad-
verseness or not. That is where the 'actual injury' requirement comes from." Id.
Therefore, any reliance on Flast by Justice Souter was misplaced; the Flast
conception of standing was no longer the current view of the standing doctrine by
the Court. In rejecting the Flast Court's reliance on the presence of "concrete ad-
verseness," Flast, 393 U.S. at 101, Justice Scalia stated that not everyone who can
demonstrate concrete adverseness "can call in the courts to examine the propriety
of "executive action." Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2181 n.3. "Depriving someone of an
arguable ... claim inflict actual injury because it deprives him of something of
value - arguable claims are settled, bought and sold. Depriving someone of a
frivolous claim, on the other hand, deprives him of nothing at all, except perhaps
the punishment of Rule 11 sanctions." Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2181 n.3.
206. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2179.
207. See id. at 2195-96.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 2180.
210. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2190.
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/4
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access case law to suggest that "the State must enable the pris-
oner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in
court."211 Any claim to the contrary is "now disclaim[ed." 212 In
other words, Bounds does not require the State to provide legal
libraries or their equivalent so that the prisoners can go to court
for any grievance they might have. Rather, the cases preceding
Bounds found that prisoners have a right to access the courts
for the sole purpose of fighting their incarceration generally or
"to challenge the conditions of their confinement. '21 3 Bounds
could not have intended "to guarantee inmates the wherewithal
to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing
everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall
claims."214
Although this case was a class action, the named plaintiffs
nonetheless needed to demonstrate actual injury to them-
selves. 215 Such a showing would have at least ensured the sur-
vival of the claim upon a motion to dismiss. However, this case
reached the Court long after the pleadings, and therefore a
more stringent analysis of standing was required.216
The district court found that only two named plaintiffs suf-
fered actual injury by being denied the capability of filing viable
claims.217 This finding of standing, with regard to the two
211. Id. at 2181.
212. Id.
213. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2182.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 2183.
216. See id.
Since [elements of standing] are not mere pleading requirements, but rather
an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case, each element [of standing] must
be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof.... At the pleading stage, general factual allega-
tions of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a
motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those spe-
cific facts that are necessary to support the claim. In response to a summary
judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere
allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts,
which for the purpose of the summary judgement motion will be taken to be
true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be supported
adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.
Id. at 2183 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
217. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2182. In so holding, the Court rejected:
[pletitioners' conten[tion] that 'any lack of access experienced by these two
inmates is not attributable to unconstitutional State policies,' because
29
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named plaintiffs, the Supreme Court held, was not enough to
warrant the district court's injunctive order:
The actual-injury requirement would hardly serve the purpose...
of preventing courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the polit-
ical branches . . . if once a plaintiff demonstrated harm from one
particular inadequacy in government administration, the court
were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administra-
tion. The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy
that produced the injury-in-fact that the plaintiff has
established.218
Even disregarding the separation of powers problem, there
was still a question of whether the district court's finding of two
instances of injury warranted the system-wide relief found in
the its injunction. 219 The Court reasoned that to receive system-
wide relief, there must be a showing of a system-wide Bounds
violation.220 The Court held that "[tihese two instances were a
patently inadequate basis for a conclusion of systemize viola-
tions and imposition of systemize relief."221 While:
the District Court also noted that "the trial testimony . . .indi-
cated that there are prisoners who are unable to research the law
because of their functional illiteracy," . . . the Constitution does
not require that prisoners (literate or illiterate) be able to conduct
generalized research, but only that they be able to present their
grievances to the courts - a more limited capability that can be
produced by a much more limited degree of legal assistance. 222
ADOC 'has met its constitutional obligations' . . . The claim appears to be
that all inmates, including the illiterate and non-English speaking, have a
right to nothing more than 'physical access to excellent libraries . . . .' This
misreads Bounds, which we have said guarantees no particular methodol-
ogy but rather the conferral of a capability - the capability of bringing con-
templated challenges to sentences and conditions of confinement before the
courts. When any inmate... shows that an actionable claim of this nature
• . .has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is
currently being prevented,.., he demonstrates that the State has failed to
furnish adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained
in the law.
Id. (citations omitted).
218. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2183 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038,
2048-50 (1995)).







C. Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part
Justice Souter, while agreeing that there was an insuffi-
cient factual predicate to support the district court's sweeping
injunction, nonetheless disagreed with the Court's treatment of
standing in this case.223 The question for review before the
Court was a challenge to the district court's remedy of a consti-
tutional violation, "not whether proof of actual injury is neces-
sary to establish standing to litigate a Bounds claim."224 He
pointed out that even the petitioners conceded the inmates had
met all the requirements of the standing doctrine. 225 The peti-
tioners' disagreement lay with the lower courts' finding, on the
merits, that the ADOC had in fact unlawfully hindered inmate
access to the courts.226 Therefore, there was no reason for the
Court to enter into a discussion of the "difficult conceptual ques-
tion" of standing.227 He noted such an inquiry was "unnecessary
to resolution of this case, was never addressed by the District
Court or Court of Appeals, and divided what would otherwise
presumably have been a unanimous Court."228
While there may have been no standing for non-English
speaking and lockdown prisoners,229 the same could not be said
for the class of illiterate inmates. "One class representative
[Barthholic] has standing, as the Court concedes, and with the
right to sue thus established, standing doctrine has no further
part to play in considering the illiterate prisoners' claims."230
223. See id. at 2200-01.
224. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2200.
225. See id. at 2201.
226. See id. While admitting that the Court is "certainly free.., to raise [sua
sponte] an issue of standing as going to Article III jurisdiction, and must do so
when we would lack jurisdiction[,]" here, there was simply no reason for the court
to reach that issue. Id. (citations omitted).
227. Id. at 2201.
228. Id.
229. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2201. "A determination even at the end of trial
that the court is not prepared to award any remedy that would benefit the plain-
tiffis] may be expressed as a conclusion that the plaintiff[s] lac[k] standing." Id.
(citing WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 3531.6).
230. Id. The finding that one class representative, the named representative,
had standing is sufficient to allow that named plaintiff to obtain relief for the
whole class. See id.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, was also somewhat puzzled by the Court's discus-
sion of standing. "As I understand the record ... the State appears to have con-




In fact, the Court stated "that the standing of at least one of the
class-action plaintiffs suffices for our jurisdiction and [there is]
no dispute that standing doctrine does not address the principal
issue in the case."231
Justice Souter next questioned the Court's approach to the
case. He stated that:
Justice Scalia says he is not applying a standing rule when he
concludes (as I also do) that systematic relief is inappropriate
here... he also makes it clear.., that he does not rest his conclu-
sion (as I rest mine) solely on the failure to prove that in every
Arizona prison... the State denied court access to illiterate pris-
oners .... Instead, he explains that a failure to prove more than
two illiterate prisoners suffered [injury] is the reason for reversal.
Since he does not intend to be applying his standing rule in so
saying, I assume he is applying a class-action rule.232
Justice Souter reminded the majority that this approach is as
unnecessary as the invocation of the standing doctrine.233 The
proper decision should simply have been based upon the fact
that "the state of the evidence simply left the District Court
without an adequate basis for the exercise of its equitable dis-
cretion in issuing an order covering the entire system."234 Re-
spondents simply failed to prove system wide injury, and
therefore system-wide relief was unwarranted. 235
Though it was unnecessary for the Court to reach the
standing issue, its analysis of standing was nonetheless con-
trary to the approach Justice Souter would have taken. 236
majority chooses to address these issues unnecessarily and, in some instances, in-
correctly." Id. at 2207. Justice Stevens went on to note the irony in the majority's
position regarding the injury requirement, and the finding of injury in this case.
"[E]ven the majority finds on the record that at least two of the plaintiffs had
standing in this case which should be sufficient to satisfy any constitutional con-
cerns. Yet the Court spends 10 pages disagreeing" with the claim that Respon-
dents had standing. Id. Justice Stevens also surmised that because the ADOC
had conceded to respondent's standing, that issue was never litigated. See id. at
2207. There would not have been a need to fill the record with all the instances of
inmates suffering actual injury; therefore, there were likely more instances of ac-
tual injury than were placed on the record. See id.
231. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2207.








While the Court's opinion would require district courts to deter-
mine the merits of a plaintiffs underlying claims in determin-
ing if that plaintiff has standing, Justice Souter "would go no
further than to require that a prisoner have some concrete
grievance or gripe about the conditions of his confinement, the
validity of his conviction, or perhaps some other problem for
which he could seek legal redress."237
D. Justice Thomas, concurring
Justice Thomas wrote separately to, inter alia, demonstrate
the flaws of Bounds v. Smith.238 "[Wihile the Constitution may
guarantee State inmates an opportunity to bring suit to vindi-
cate their federal constitutional rights, I find no basis in the
Constitution - and Bounds cited none - for the right to have the
government finance the endeavor."239 He declared that never
before Bounds had the Court found a "fundamental constitu-
tional right" of access to the courts for inmates. 240 "Although
our cases prior to Bounds had occasionally referenced a consti-
tutional right of access to the courts, we had never before recog-
nized a freestanding constitutional right that requires the
States to 'shoulder affirmative obligations,' in order to 'insure
237. Id. Justice Souter offered three reasons why his analysis was the proper
approach to any standing questions raised. First, the merit of an inmate's claim
should play no part in the standing inquiry. See id. Rather, the simple existence
of a proper grievance will ensure "concrete adverseness" and hence adversarial liti-
gation. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Second, Bounds did not require the
provision of legal research materials only to those inmates likely to succeed. See
Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2203-04. An inmate's likelihood of success should be of no
moment regarding his ability to research legal claims. Finally, the Court's re-
quirement of a nonfrivolous claim only serves to create a great amount of pre-
litigation litigation. See id. at 2204. There will be in effect a pre-trial inquiry into
the merits of the case to determine whether there is a viable case on the merits.
See id. at 2102.
238. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
239. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2186. "This case is not about the right of'access to
the courts.' There is no proof that Arizona has prevented even a single inmate
from filing a civil rights lawsuit or submitting a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Instead, this case is about the extent to which the Constitution requires a
State to finance or otherwise assist a prisoner's efforts to bring suit against the




PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:377
that inmates' access to the courts is adequate, effective, and
meaningful."' 241
Justice Thomas then described the two distinct lines of pre-
cedent which formed the basis of the Bounds decision. 242 "One
of these lines, rooted largely in the principles of equal protec-
tion, invalidated state filing and transcript fees and imposed
limited affirmative obligations on the States to ensure that
their criminal procedures did not discriminate on the basis of
poverty."243 In discussing this equal protection line, Thomas
first cited Griffin 244 as standing solely for the proposition that a
state cannot deny access to appellate review solely on the basis
of indigeny.245 Next, Justice Thomas cited Douglas as another
case articulating the principle that states may not discriminate
on the basis of wealth. He further refuted any claim that the
Douglas Court's "passing reference to 'fair procedure"' 246 impli-
cated the due process clause as the constitutional source of the
Court's holding:
It is difficult to see how the due process clause could be implicated
in these cases, given our consistent reaffirmation that the States
241. Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, Justice Thomas noted that Bounds
failed to cite even a single constitutional basis for its holding. "But the majority in
Bounds failed to identify a single provision of the Constitution to support the right
created in that case, a fact that did not go unnoticed in strong dissents by Chief
Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist." Id. Justice Thomas cited Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974) as support for his argument:
The weakness of the Court's constitutional analysis in Bounds is punctuated
by our inability, in the 20 years since, to agree upon the constitutional
source of the supposed right. We have described the right articulated in
Bounds as a 'consequence' of due process, as an 'aspect' of equal protection,
or as an "equal protection guarantee."
Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2187 (citation omitted).
242. See id. at 2188.
243. Id.
244. 351 U.S. 12 (1955) "In light of the Griffin Court's unanimous pronounce-
ment that a State is not constitutionally required to provide any court access to
criminals who wish to challenge their convictions, the Bounds Court's description
of Griffin as ensuring 'adequate appellate review,' is unsustainable." Lewis, 116 S.
Ct. at 2189 (citation omitted).
245. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2189. "Justice Frankfurter... confirmed in a
separate writing that it was invidious discrimination, and not the denial of ade-
quate, effective, or meaningful access to the courts, that rendered the Illinois regu-
lation unconstitutional." Id. (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1955)).





can abolish criminal appeals altogether consistently with due pro-
cess. The fact that a State affords some access 'does not automati-
cally mean that a State then acts unfairly,'and hence violates due
process, by denying indigents assistance 'at every stage of the
way.' Under our cases, '[ulnfairness results only if indigents are
singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to the ap-
pellate system because of their poverty,' a question 'more profita-
bly considered under an equal protection analysis.' 247
Justice Thomas stated, however, that Bounds went far be-
yond the reasoning of Griffin and Douglas, when "the Court cre-
ated a new and different right" for prisoners. 248 In other words,
Bounds failed to follow the boundaries of the equal protection
analysis upon which these two cases were founded. Addition-
ally, even "assuming that Bounds properly relied"249 upon these
cases, the Court critically failed to take into account the equal
protection cases which "rejected [the] disparate impact theory of
the Equal Protection Clause."250 Such a holding does not de-
prive an inmate of the ability to file claims as an indigent in-
mate who, "[Iike anyone else seeking to bring a suit without the
assistance of the State ... can seek the advise of an attorney,
whether pro bono or paid, and can turn to family members,
friends, other inmates, or public interest groups" for the aid
they need.251 Thus Justice Thomas stated:
the Bounds Court's reliance on our transcript and fee cases was
misplaced in two significant respects. First, those cases did not
stand for the proposition for which Bounds cited them: they were
about equal access, not access per se. Second, the constitutional
247. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2190 n.3 (citations omitted).
248. Id. at 2190. "Only by divorcing our prior holdings from their reasoning,
and elevating dicta over constitutional principle, was the [Bounds] Court able to
[effect] [tihe unjustified transformation of the right to nondiscretionary access to
the courts into the broader, untethered right to legal assistance generally." Id.
This circuitous route "would be reason enough for [Justice Thomas] to conclude
that Bounds was wrongly decided." Id.
249. Id.
250. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2191. Thomas relies upon Rodriguez indicating the
refutation of the disparate impact theory of equal protection analysis, wherein
"wealth discrimination alone [does not] provid[e] an adequate basis for involving
strict scrutiny." Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2191 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Bd. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29). See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(rejecting the disparate impact theory of equal protection).




basis for Griffin and its progeny had been seriously undermined
in the years preceding Bounds.252
Justice Thomas next discussed the "second line of cases"
wherein "we invalidated state prison regulations that restricted
or effectively prohibited inmates from filing habeas corpus peti-
tions or civil rights lawsuits in federal court to vindicate feder-
ally protected rights."253 Justice Thomas cited to the Ex Parte
Hull,254 Johnson v. Avery,255 and Wolff v. McDonnell 25 6 line of
decisions.25 7 While recognizing these cases as based upon ac-
cess in its own right,258 Justice Thomas noted that "they im-
posed no affirmative obligations on the States to facilitate
access, and held only that States may not 'abridge or impair"'
an inmate's ability to enter the courts. 259
Justice Thomas next discredited the Bounds Court's fusion
of the two disparate lines of cases. "[Tihe equation of these two
lines of cases allowed the Bounds Court to preserve the 'affirma-
tive obligations' element of the equal access cases ... by linking
it with Ex Parte Hull, which had not been undermined by later
cases but which imposed no affirmative obligations."260
In conclusion, Justice Thomas declared that there is a lim-
ited, constitutionally protected right of access to the courts, one
"rooted in the Due Process Clause and the principle articulated
in Ex Parte Hull."261 This right is the "right not to be arbitrarily
prevented from lodging a claimed violation of a federal right in
a federal court."262 Nonetheless, there is no constitutionally
252. Id. at 2193.
253. Id. at 2188.
254. 312 U.S. 546 (1940).
255. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
256. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
257. Noticeably absent from Justice Thomas' analysis was any discussion of
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), which was a critical precedent in the
Bounds decision.
258. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2193.
259. Id. at 2188 (quoting Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. at 549).
260. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2194 (citations omitted). "By detaching Griffin's
right of equal access and Ex parte Hull's right to physical access from the reason-
ing on which each of these rights was based, the Bounds Court created a virtually






mandated requirement that the state affirmatively expend re-
sources in providing prisoners' access to the courts.263
IV. Analysis
In analyzing Lewis v. Casey,264 it is worth asking what the
undercurrents are. The most likely answer is the Court's frus-
tration with the flood of prisoner-initiated lawsuits into the
courts throughout the nation.265 One often hears something to
the effect that prisoners are simply filing lawsuits in order to
get a free day away from their jail. Thus, when confronted with
a class action, where the class is effectively the entire prison
population of Arizona, there is cause for concern. Next, con-
sider that this class of prisoners is going to court to claim that
they are denied their fundamental right266 of access to the
courts, or more precisely that they are hindered from airing
their grievances in the courts, and there is cause for panic.
Against this backdrop, the Lewis Court offered no princi-
pled basis for its decision and arguably dismissed the Arizona
prisoners' claim267 based on fear of increased prisoner litigation.
The failure of the prisoners' complaint, in and of itself presents
no major doctrinal problems. The lower courts would have been
well within their jurisdiction to exercise their equitable powers
by not issuing the sweeping injunction. However, the lower
courts, in a sense, succumbed to the fear of opening the prison
litigation flood-gates even wider.268 The problems arise, how-
ever, when one begins to examine the Court's opinion and try to
parse out the doctrinal basis for its decision.
The Court has once again demonstrated the uncertainty of
the standing doctrine and shown that it is fully capable of
manipulating standing to effectively reach the merits of a case
through a back door.269 In Lewis, the Court further obscured
the standing doctrine by discussing both the respondent's
263. See id.
264. 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1995).
265. See, e.g., Robert G. Doumar, Prisoner Cases: Feeding the Monster in the
Judicial Closet, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 21 (1994).
266. See supra Part II, Section B(1)(a).
267. See 116 S. Ct. at 2200.
268. See Id.




standing to sue and the merits of the case. "The judicial eye
appears to be peering beyond preliminary access issues to take
into account a variety of interests traditionally considered irrel-
evant to the standing determination."270 One truly cannot come
away from this opinion without a "sense of intellectual crisis." 271
Therein lies the major flaw in Lewis. There was no basis
for the Court to hold that plaintiffs had no standing to sue, yet
then proceed with a discussion of the merits as related to the
underlying constitutional standard for inmate access to the
courts, as articulated in Bounds v. Smith.272 With respect to
merits, the Court proceeded to restrict the scope of prisoner ac-
cess to the courts as defined in Bounds.273 An inmate now has
no ability to claim that he was injured by a Bounds violation
where the source of that injury stems from an inability to file
any suit other than a habeas corpus petition or a civil rights
action related directly to the condition of his confinement.27 4
Regardless of whether this is the correct interpretation of the
right espoused in Bounds,275 the Court should never have con-
sidered that issue. Because the Court decided the case based
upon the plaintiffs' lack of standing, the analysis should have
ended there. 276
Putting aside the decision regarding the merits for the mo-
ment, the standing analysis itself seems to miss the mark, fur-
ther confusing the law of standing, specifically as it relates to
class actions. It has generally been understood that in a class
270. Nichol, supra note 20, at 69. Professor Nichol, ever critical of the stand-
ing doctrine in its current guise, stated that the doctrine "is a schizophrenic body of
law in which the Court announces that one set of interests are dispositive (the
plaintiffs stake in the litigation), while in the bulk of the major cases other factors
appear to prevail (separation of powers, federalism concerns, the desirability of the
claim on the merits, etc.)." Id. at 70.
271. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19.
272. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
273. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2181.
274. See supra notes 214-219 and accompanying text.
275. There is good reason to believe that this is an incorrect interpretation of
Bounds. See supra Section II(B). Additionally, it is even arguable that any restric-
tions or limitations by the Court stated in dicta, with respect to Bounds, will not be
applied by the lower courts.
276. A finding that the plaintiffs had no standing is equivalent to a finding
that the courts had no jurisdiction to even hear the case; standing is, after all,
jurisdictional. See supra notes 236-238. Without jurisdiction to hear the case,




action, the class' standing is established when the named plain-
tiffs, the class representatives, can demonstrate that they have
personally suffered an actual injury.27 7 Therefore, as a practical
matter, as soon as it has been demonstrated that a class repre-
sentative has individual standing, the case should proceed to a
determination on the merits.278
In Lewis, the Court, however, takes a different and some-
what unclear approach to this issue. The Court concedes that
in the record, the lower courts clearly found two instances of
actual injury to the named plaintiffs. 279 Having identified the
existence of those two instances of injury, the Court next
"turn[ed] to the question whether those injuries... support[ed]
the injunction ordered in this case."28 0 The clear import of this
statement is that, once standing has been established, the
Court will then proceed to the merits. Nonetheless, the need to
proceed to the merits, in light of the finding of injury, seems to
be supported by the Court's own assertion:
that a suit may be a class action.., adds nothing to the question
of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class "must
allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that
injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the
class to which they belong and which they purport to
represent."28'
It seems rather remarkable that the Court would assert that
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate standing. This passage
clearly supports the claim that there was class standing, as the
277. See 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALABA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS,
§ 2.01 at 2-3 (3rd ed. 1992). "Once threshold individual standing by the class repre-
sentative is met, a proper party to raise a particular issue is before the court, and
there remains no further separate class standing requirement in the constitutional
sense." Id. § 2.05 at 2-29. This view of class action standing law was echoed in
Justice Souter's concurring opinion. "More specifically, the propriety of awarding
class-wide relief (in this case, affecting the entire prison system) does not require a
demonstration that some or all of the un-named class could themselves satisfy the
standing requirements for named plaintiffs." Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2201
(1996).
278. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2201 (Souter, J., concurring)
279. See id. at 2182.
280. Id. at 2183.
281. Id. (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40
n.20 (1976), quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975)).
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plaintiffs did "allege and show"28 2 an actual personal injury, and
therefore were proper representatives of the class. Indeed, the
Court conceded as much.283
However, "[s]ince [the standing requirements] are not mere
pleading requirements, but rather an indispensable part of the
plaintiff's case, each element" necessary to establish standing
must be fully proved at trial.284 In discussing the plaintiffs'
proof adduced at trial regarding standing, the Court noted that
the district "court found actual injury on the part of only one
named plaintiff,... and the cause of that injury.., was failure
of the prison to provide the special services that [were] needed,
in light of [the inmates] illiteracy."28 5 This is essentially a fail-
ure in the class certification rather than a failure to prove
standing.28 6 In other words, it is apparent that the Court has
found the plaintiff class without standing because of a failure to
prove injury to all class members.
282. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2183 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 40 n.20 (1976), quot-
ing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975)).
283. "The general allegations of the complaint in the present case may well
have sufficed to claim injury by named plaintiffs, and hence standing to demand
remediation.. . ." Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2183.
284. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
285. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2183.
286. See id. at 2208. "If the named class plaintiffs have standing, the stand-
ing of the class members is satisfied by the requirements for class certification.
Because the State did not challenge that certification, it is rather late in the game
to now give it the advantage of a conclusion that the class was improper." Id. at
2208 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice Scalia responded to Justice Steven's claim by stating that the Court
was not concluding that the class certification was improper, rather "[tihe standing
determination is quite separate from certification of the class." Id. at 2184 n.6.
The Court was simply declaring that the standing of one inmate, Bartholic, who
based his standing upon the alleged injury resulting from inadequate legal re-
search facilities for illiterate inmates, was not enough for that inmate to then sue
on behalf of other inmates with different injuries. Id. Thus, Bartholic could only
represent a class of illiterate inmates, and not, for instance, a class of non-English
speaking inmates. Of course, behind the Court's rhetoric was the inescapable con-
clusion that the class was simply not proper. Clearly if the class was proper, and
Bartholic was a properly named representative of that class, then he should have





Have the boundaries of Bounds v. Smith2 7 in fact been re-
stricted by Lewis v. Casey?288 The answer must be a resounding
no. Justice Scalia explicitly reversed the lower courts based
upon a finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue in the
federal courts.28 9 Such a conclusion by the Court is tantamount
to finding a non-justiciable issue. In other words, at the very
outset of analysis, the Court concluded that it was without the
constitutional authority to begin to address the issues raised by
the plaintiffs. There was no constitutionally recognized case
before the Court.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that any discussion of the
scope of Bounds was unnecessary to the ultimate disposition of
Lewis holding that plaintiffs had not presented a cognizable
claim in the federal courts. In the context of access to courts
litigation, Lewis imposes a painstakingly detailed consideration
of the representative plaintiffs' standing. While this is essen-
tially the equivalent standard previously required by the Court,
Lewis seems to "up" the "pleading ante" with regards to the nec-
essary showing of standing. Quite simply, class representatives
will need to demonstrate that they have clearly suffered an in-
jury with regard to the constitutional right in question. Be-
cause the standing requirements are essentially unchanged by
Lewis, only time will tell how the lower federal courts will inter-
pret this case, and what prisoners must do to satisfy standing in
the context of access to the courts challenges.
David Steinberger
287. 430 U.S. 817.
288. 116 S. Ct. 2174.
289. See id. at 2185.
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